A 14th Century Military Revolution?

Lindsay Webster

Military Revolution? To what extent did the wars of Scotland witness major changes in the way armies were raised and employed?

One of the most turbulent times in Scottish history was the wars of the late thirteenth century up until the mid fourteenth century. This was a time when the ruling dynasty of Scotland changed three times and relations with England went from being on the whole peaceful and cordial to a situation of endemic warfare. What effect did this warfare have on the Scottish military? Did the way armies were raised change significantly? Also how did Scottish military tactics change over the course of the early fourteenth century? To answer this it is necessary to examine how the army of Alexander III was raised and compare it to how Robert I and David II gathered troops to their banners. This essay will then examine the evolution of the tactics used by the Scots between 1297 and the death of Robert I.[1]

During the reign of David I, who is described by an Anglo-Norman chronicler as having ‘rubbed off the rust of Scottish barbarism,’[2] Scotland became basically a feudal nation. Under this system, the army of Scotland was effectively divided in two between those owing “Scottish Service” and those who owed “Free Service.” Free service was performed by the nobility in exchange for their estates while Scottish service was performed by commoners and each area had to provide a quota of men depending on various measurements of land such as the “davoch” the “ploughgate” and the “ounceland.”[3] It would appear that in the thirteenth century, free service could also be performed as an archer as they needed special training and were therefore more valuable than rank and file spearmen.[4] Apparently payment of soldiers was a rare occurrence, only specialist troops receiving wages.[5] This is one thing that appears to have changed to a certain extent under Bruce. Duncan says that in the armies after 1311, the armies were actually paid using the plunder taken from the north of England.[6] Duncan backs this up saying that the length of the campaigns into England, many of which lasted more than the obligated 40 days, shows that soldiers must have been paid.[7] Barrow is of the opinion that although there were the two separate armies, my the middle of the century and certainly by the end of it, the two were beginning to converge into one unified force.[8] This would help disprove the idea of a revolution and show more long-term changes.

            It is difficult to say how armies were equipped before the parliament of 1318 (see below). The knights probably dressed themselves the same as knights from all over Europe and several effigies from this period survive, although in a rather poor condition.[9] Only two illustrations of the infantry survive; one in the Carlisle charter[10] and one from a document known as Liver A.[11] Both show lightly armed and armoured infantry and probably represent the highland troops known as “Caterans.” [12] There is also a description in the Norwegian “Hakon’s Sags” which describes them as being armed with “mostly bows and Irish axes.”[13]

Perhaps one of the most significant documents relating to the raising of armies is from the 1318 Parliament. To give some background, earlier in the year, Edward Bruce had been killed at the battle of Fauchart in Ireland. Most of his invading force had died alongside him including the head of the MacDonald family, Angus Og. With the loss of this army, it is probable that Scotland lost a large number of the hardened veteran soldiers who had followed Bruce since his seizure of power in 1306. One of the statutes of the Parliament seems to be trying to fill this gap in the line by decreeing what form of equipment men should have according to their value. Previously it had only been knights who had to own certain war-gear. The statute demands that all men with lands or goods worth £10 Scots had to own a bascinet helmet or an iron hat, a quilted aketon or a mail hauberk, plated gloves, and a sword. It also declared that any man with goods worth the value of a cow had to own a spear or bow and arrows.[14] The “ten pound men”, who would probably include burgesses and wealthier peasant farmers, seem to be being called upon to form a new hard core of the Scottish schiltrons, men who can stand in the front ranks while the lesser men form the rear ranks. It is interesting that the equipment requirements of the ten pound men is almost exactly the manner of equipment seen on Islesmen gravestones in the Hebrides.[15] Was it these sorts of troops that Bruce was trying to emulate or replace with his 1318 statutes? This is certainly a possibility as Angus Og was on the expedition and would have had a large contingent of Islesmen in his service. Speaking from personal experience, the required gear of the ten pound men is very practical, combining reasonable protection with manoeuvrability and the gear is light enough to wear all day while on the march.

            The 1318 statutes also laid down rules as to how the army was to behave while on campaign.[16] It is interesting that these laws only refer to “the army” making no distinction between the nobility and the commoners and indeed the statute concerning theft, rape and murder applies to “anyone, whatever status they shall be.” This seems to show the development of a unified army as opposed to the clear divide between noble and commoner seen in earlier armies. The statutes are also designed to prevent plundering and looting by troops, presumably only while the army was in Scotland but this is not made clear. This suggests that Robert was trying to turn his army into a more disciplined fighting force than it had been previously. It also suggests that looting had been a major problem since there would be no need of such a law if it were not.

            Duncan notes that in the reign of Robert I there was a great increase in the number of land grants requiring military service, in particular, archer service. This demonstrates that there was a shortage of such troops and shows Robert trying to rectify this situation.[17]

            In the reign of David II we see a major change in military recruitment when David resorts to hiring mercenary troops to deal with his own upstart nobility. This is recorded in the chronicle of John of Fordun who states that the king “mustered his lieges from the four corners of his land, offering them much money for their pay.”[18] While this can be seen as a new direction in Scottish recruitment, it probably only represents steps taken under extreme circumstances, in this case the outbreak of a civil war where the King would need to trust the men fighting for him. The fact that Fordun makes mention of the men being paid shows that it was something out of the ordinary and therefore was not a regular occurrence.

The tactical change for which the Scots were most famous was the development of their spear formations, better known as “schiltrons.” Between the battle of Dunbar and the battle of Bannockburn, the schiltron evolved into a disciplined, mobile and effective military unit. The Battle of Dunbar was a horrific defeat for the Scots. In it, the Scottish force launched a ragged charge against an enemy they perceived to be in retreat and was cut to pieces. This shows the Scottish army to be poorly disciplined and ineffective on the battlefield. However, despite this defeat, the Scots still brought another army to the field a year later for the Battle of Stirling Bridge. This time the army was carefully marshalled by William Wallace and Andrew Murray and Bower gives a detailed description of the army organisation from units of five men to those of a thousand.[19] There is some debate as to whether it was Wallace or Murray in overall command but whoever it was, the battle show considerable tactical cunning. The Scots allowed a portion of the English cavalry to cross the narrow bridge over the Forth and then rushed from the Abbey Craig,[20] surrounding the English and annihilating the troops on their side of the bridge. To be able to keep the army in position until the right moment suggests that a greater level of discipline was being instilled into the Scottish troops. Armstrong suggests that Wallace and Murray used existing army structures to train their army into a disciplined force.[21]

            In the following year, after a winter spent raiding England,[22] the Scots once more faced an English host in the field. This was a battle that Wallace could have avoided but decided to fight. His army was drawn up in four roughly circular schiltrons with archers in between them and cavalry supporting. The aim behind the schiltron was to present a disciplined wall of spears to the English cavalry whose horses would not charge into the masses of men. Vital to the success of this formation was keeping the formation disciplined and tight, not an easy prospect when faced by several thousand heavy cavalry. However, they achieved this and defeated the charge of the English horse.[23] Unfortunately, Edward I then deployed his archers. Forced to maintain their close formation due to the presence of the surviving cavalry and unable to advance upon the archers, the Scots were shot to pieces and when they broke the cavalry punished them for their earlier resistance. While the Scots were defeated, they did prove that heavy cavalry was not invincible. However, the real weakness of their formation was shown; it could not manoeuvre and thus was tactically inflexible. For the next few years, the Scots changed to mainly guerrilla tactics, avoiding pitched battles with the English during the campaign seasons and then retaking losses during the winter. It was Robert I who would once more take up the idea of infantry warfare.

At the battle of Loudon hill, if Barbour is to be believed, Robert’s schiltron, although heavily outnumbered, stood up to the cavalry of the Earl of Pembroke. Here the Scots deployed much as Wallace had at Falkirk but with a major difference. According to Barbour, they dug pits and trenches to channel the English force onto their pikes where they could be easily defeated.[24] The battle of Loudon hill is probably not the best evidence of a military revolution. The army commanded by Pembroke was apparently all cavalry, lacking the archers that had made the crucial difference at Falkirk. However, it does show Bruce thinking about how he would use his infantry to greatest effect and the pre-prepared battlefield was a feature that he would use again at Bannockburn.

The battle of Bannockburn marked the high-watermark of Scottish pitched battle tactics. This battle saw the culmination of the strategies that had gradually been evolving since 1297. Before the battle, Bruce had gathered his army in the Torwood. Here he trained them to operate the schiltron more effectively. Most importantly, he taught it to move, becoming more like an ancient pike phalanx than the circular formations used by Wallace. It is also likely that he trained them to stand firm in the face of charging cavalry. It would also appear that the majority of the knights present dismounted and fought on foot alongside the common soldiery. At Bannockburn, Bruce chose his ground well, ensuring the English were channelled into a narrow area and the ground he knew they would be forced to attack across, he had prepared with pits as deep as a man’s knee designed to break the legs of horses.[25]

On the first day of the battle, Bruce used the schiltron commanded by Thomas Randolph to quickly move from the woods to block the path of a force of cavalry under Lord Clifford.[26] The spearmen then fought off the horsemen and forced them into an embarrassing withdrawal. Other actions against the static pike-blocks floundered amongst the pits and on the Scottish pikes. The opening day also saw King Robert defeat sir Henry de Bohun.

On the Second day, the Scots assembled their ranks and advanced upon the English. This was almost unheard of in mediaeval warfare: infantry did not attack cavalry except in ambushes.[27] This advance caught the English off guard and they were unable to deploy effectively meaning that they charged piecemeal into the Scots to inevitable defeat. The English archers apparently did come into play briefly, defeating the Scottish contingents drawn from Ettrick forest, but were eventually chased from the field by the Scottish light cavalry. As English morale wavered, the Scottish camp followers and troops not part of the schiltrons charged from a concealed position, panicking the English and causing a rout in which many were killed or captured. King Edward only just escaped capture, being forced to beat Scots away from his horse before being escorted to safety.

The battle of Bannockburn demonstrates the effectiveness of massed pikes when used effectively and with cavalry support. It also demonstrated again that heavy cavalry were not invincible.

Perhaps one of the most significant developments in Scottish warfare was the development of fast-paced mounted warfare. The Scots were never renowned for their large warhorses and the Destrier was never bred in Scotland. However, they were experts at producing smaller horses and ponies. This lack of big horses was not as great a disadvantage as might be thought as the smaller horses were far more nimble and thus better suited for the style of warfare preferred by the Scots.[28] The best example of this nimbleness has to be in the accounts of Bannockburn where King Robert’s smaller pony side-steps the destrier of Henry de Bohun allowing the king to kill the knight. During the Wars of Independence, a new troop type gained popularity and came to be a dominant and inspiring force in both Scottish and English armies; the Hobilar. A hobilar was essentially a mounted infantryman. In theory, hobilars would ride while on campaign but dismount to fight any pitched battles, they also proved highly useful as light cavalry suited for raiding and patrolling. It should be noted that the word ‘hobilar’ is never used to describe Scottish soldiers but the method of fighting used by the Scots matches what is generally taken to be hobilar warfare.

A good account of the Scots on campaign is given by the continental chronicler Jean Froissart. He recalls that the Scots “are all mounted on horseback, except for the camp followers who are on foot. The knights and the squires are all well mounted on good bay horses, and the common people on ponies. They never take transport on wheels with them because of the wild mountains they have to cross in Northumberland.”[29] Froissart goes on to say that the army on campaign lives mainly on beef and oatcakes, the oats for which each man carried himself. This shows the Scots having evolved their army into a highly manoeuvrable force capable of operating in the field without large and cumbersome baggage trains. Froissart also claims that the Scots were capable of putting 20,000 men into the saddle for their raids. While this is probably an exaggeration, it does illustrate the great change from an army that mostly travelled on foot. The speed of these armies is alluded to when Froissart says “when they make their forays into England they cover sixty to seventy miles at a stretch, night or day.”[30] The real tactical advantage of these fast armies was that they could easily outpace slower English forces and only fought battles when they had the advantage. This was a strategy evolved by Bruce during his time as a guerrilla fighter after his seizure of the throne in 1306. The Scalacronica also notes that when Bruce was ambushed at Methven, his army was “all on horseback”[31] possibly showing the early developments of his later fast-paced armies.

Bruce’s tactics in the north can be seen in the letters written by his enemies to the English king. One from William, Earl of Ross complains that when Bruce’s force, which was probably not that large, came to Ross, Sutherland and Caithness, 3000 men were not sufficient to defend it suggesting Bruce was using these tactics to force his enemies to overstretch their military resources to make defeating them easier.[32] Another letter sent by John of Mowbray says that when he came to relieve the castle of Elgin which was being besieged by Bruce, “the said enemy retreated to his strongholds”[33]

The fast paced, mounted armies could also be used in a semi-defensive role. The best example of this is seen in 1319 when Edward II besieged Berwick with a sizeable force. Knowing that they would be unable to defeat the English force outside the walls and relieve the city, the Scots raised a cavalry force and plunged deep into England, bypassing the English army at Berwick and raiding into Yorkshire. Here they were opposed by a local force of inferior soldiers whom they crushed at the battle of Myton-Upon-Swale. The news of this defeat caused Edward to lift the siege of Berwick and march south to confront the Scots. However as the Lanercost Chronicle records, “they (the Scots) got wind of this and entered Scotland with their captives and booty of cattle.”[34]

            The ultimate triumph of this style of warfare was the Weardale campaign of 1327. This was a large scale raid led by Douglas and was interestingly Edward III’s first taste of military action. In this campaign (recorded in great detail by Froissart) the Scots raided into England, running rings around the much larger and slower English force. At one point Douglas and a troop of men rode straight into the English camp and got to the guy ropes of the King’s tent before being driven back. Eventually, when the English thought they had the Scots trapped, they slipped away across the border leaving the young Edward humiliated.[35]

Perhaps one of the most significant developments in Scottish military thinking during this period was the concept of total war. Prior to 1296, England and Scotland had enjoyed around two hundred years of peace broken by only about twelve years of war. Now warfare was endemic and was aimed not only at military targets but at the people themselves. Wallace had tried these tactics when he invaded England in 1297 and the idea was taken up by Bruce. One of the first examples is the so-called “Herschip of Buchan.” Robert defeated the forces of the Comyn faction and then set about destroying the land of Buchan as an example to others. This destruction is noted by Barbour who says “the king, who was well pleased with his victory… had his men burn all Buchan, from end to end, sparing none. He harried them in such a way that a good fifty years afterwards, people bemoaned the devastation of Buchan.”[36] The fact that Barbour, who was very pro-Bruce should note how shocking the destruction was shows the brutality of this new kind of warfare. Once Bruce had destroyed his enemies in the North, he was able to turn his attention to England and from 1312 onwards, was launching regular raids into the north. Here, Bruce was not normally targeting the major towns (although in 1315 he did besiege Carlisle). Instead he set his fast troops devastating the countryside of northern England. Bruce was making war on the people of England with the intent of gaining revenues through blackmail payments. In the years between Bannockburn and the truce of 1322, these raids became almost annual and caused tremendous damage to the north of England.[37] These effects are best seen in the estate accounts of Robert Reymes, a Northumbrian knight captured at Bannockburn. As a result of Scottish raiding, the revenues of his lands fell from £50 per year to just 14s 7p.[38]

During the wars, the Scots evolved new strategies and attitudes towards castles. The thirteenth century had witnessed something of a Golden Age in Scottish castle building with beautiful stone castles such as Caerlaverock and Kildrummy being constructed. These castles, while imposing looking, did not perform well for the Scots when Edward I invaded and most fell very quickly once besieged. Many castles surrendered because they knew there was no hope of a relieving army approaching and so there was no point in dying for nothing.

            When the Scots began to gain back territory there was a real problem that most of the castles were in English hands and had to be re-taken. In general, the Scots did not have enough money to employ siege engineers and construct great engines so they had to come up with other strategies to take castles. An example of this shortage is recorded in the Lanercost chronicle when Bruce was besieging Carlisle in 1315. The chronicle records that the Scots set up a single engine to use against the wall while there were seven or eight such machines within the wall loosing stones back.[39] The Scottish machine was probably a trebuchet and is illustrated in the Carlisle charter.[40] These new strategies evolved around using guile rather than the brute force and starvation tactics used in normal siege warfare. A fine example of this is the tale told by Barbour about the taking of Linlithgow Peel. Barbour says that a carter, employed to take hay into the peel, stopped his cart beneath the gate then cut the traces while eight armed men sprang from the hay, taking the peel by surprise while a concealed force stormed through the gate which would not close due to the cart.[41]

            The Scots also evolved tactics centred on the use of rope ladders in night assaults. Both Barbour and the Chronicle of Lanercost mention the ladders constructed by the Scots suggesting that they were something special and new in siege warfare. The idea was that these ladders were made of rope and wooden boards with a hook at the top to be looped over an embrasure. The ladder would be put in place by a long lance pushed into the hook. When the ladder was pulled tight, it would be impossible to unhook from the wall. Barbour mentions Douglas using them in his attack on Roxburgh[42] while the Lanercost chronicle describes ladders captured after an unsuccessful attack on Berwick. The Lanercost chronicler apparently saw these ladders and got very excited about them, devoting (in modern print) most of a page to the description, once more showing their importance.[43] The Douglas assault on Roxburgh also features more cunning in the fact that the Scots crawled up to the walls on their hands and knees wearing black cloaks so that observers would think them to be cattle.[44] Once the castle was in Scottish hands, Barbour reports that Bruce sent his brother Edward to demolish “the tower, castle and donjon.”[45] This is an example of a revolution in military tactics. Thomas Gray also mentions the demolition of castles in his Scalacronica[46] while Fordun describes the destruction of the “walls and ditches” at Perth, presumably for the same purpose.[47]

            Bruce realised that garrisons were expensive to maintain and that the favourite Scottish tactic of avoiding pitched battle meant that if a castle were to be besieged, relief was unlikely. This meant that there was very little point in maintaining any castles since they would only be of any real use to the English and so the vast majority of castles, upon recapture, were either demolished or had their defences slighted so that they could not be held by the English. This marks a radical departure from the old ideas of lordly and royal castle building although this did not last long as David II started building castles once more when he took power.

So was there truly a military revolution? This is something for which there can be no yes or no answer. The way armies were raised changed to a certain extent, but these changes appear to have already been underway in the reign of Alexander III. The integration of the common and knightly elements of the army can be seen as a significant change. Tactically, huge changes occurred, both on the battlefield and in the way campaigns were conducted. The shiltron would remain the central block of Scottish field armies until the end of the mediaeval period surviving virtually unchanged (with only a lengthening of the weapons used) into the 16^th Century and the disastrous battles at Flodden and Pinkie. The development of mounted raiding warfare was a significant step forward and became a common way to fight wars. This was the same tactic followed by Edward III on his chevauchee’s in the Hundred Years war. However, in many cases, the battlefield brilliance displayed by Bruce and his paladins seemed to have died with them. English tactics changed and the Scots did not change with them leading to disasters like Halidon hill where the Scots, having tried to lure the English away from their siege-works, ended up fighting a pitched battle and trudging uphill into a lethal barrage of arrows. Also at Neville’s Cross, poor intelligence allowed the Scottish army to be cornered and brought to battle resulting in disaster. The idea of fast-paced cavalry warfare changed the shape of the borderland between the two countries evolving into the brutal world of the Border Reiver where neither government had any real control.

            To conclude, the wars of Scotland did see a military revolution but it did not last long enough. Instead of constantly adapting, it appears that the Scots stagnated and kept following the tactics developed by Bruce and Douglas while England moved on and adopted new tactics, most notably, the massed longbowmen first used by Edward I at Falkirk.

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Bibliography

Armstrong P. Bannockburn 1314 (Oxford 2002)

Armstrong P. Stirling Bridge and Falkirk 1297-98 (Oxford 2003)

Barrow G. The Army of Alexander III’s Scotland in Reid N. Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III (Edinburgh 1990)

Brown C. The Second Scottish Wars of Independence (Stroud 2002)

Duncan A.A.M (ed.) Regesta Regum Scottorum (Edinburgh 1988)

Duncan A.A.M The War of the Scots In Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 1992

MacKay-MacKenzie W. The Mediaeval Castle in Scotland (London 1927)

McNamee C. The Wars of the Bruces (East Linton 1997)

Nicholson R. Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh 1974)

Nicolle D. Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era 1050-1350 (London 1999)

Tabraham C. Scottish Castles and Fortifications (Edinburgh 1986)

Principal Sources

Barbour’s The Bruce

Bower, Scotichronicon

John of Fordun’s Chronicle

Froissart’s Chronicles

Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica

The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough

The Chonicle of Lanercost